background image
Chapter 3: The Charter in the courts 37
Human rights informing the conduct of
public authority employees
Employees of the Victorian public service are
public authorities bound by section 38 of the
Charter. Consistent with this obligation, under
the Public Administration Act 2004, human rights
are a "public sector value" to be respected
and promoted by public officials. Further, the
Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector
Employees
requires employees to demonstrate a
commitment to human rights by making decisions
consistent with human rights and delivering
services and programs in a manner consistent
with the Charter.
These obligations were enforced in two 2012
decisions, where employees working in
community residential units were dismissed for
failing to respect human rights and for infringing
a individual's right not to be treated in a cruel,
inhuman and degrading way.
In Davies v State of Victoria,
58
the Supreme Court
considered that the treatment of a resident in
a community residential service by a disability
services officer amounted to cruel and degrading
treatment in breach of section 10(b) of the
Charter. The Charter breach amounted to serious
misconduct under the Public Administration
Act and was one of the grounds justifying his
dismissal.
In Illesca v Department of Human Services,
59
Fair Work Australia upheld the dismissal of two
disability services officers whose employment
was terminated after their treatment of a
resident was found to breach section 10(b)
of the Charter and section 8 of the Code of
Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees
(demonstrating commitment to human rights).
Where VCAT is acting in an administrative
capacity, it is a public authority bound by section
38 to give proper consideration to human rights
and to act compatibly with them.
VCAT is a public authority when it makes
a decision to grant an exemption from the
provisions of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010.
The Equal Opportunity Act also expressly
requires VCAT to consider the Charter in
exemption applications, by requiring it to
determine whether the proposed exemption is a
reasonable limit on the right to equality (section 8
of the Charter).
58 [2012] VSC 343.
59 [2012] FWA 2267.
60 There were three decisions granting exemption
applications in 2012: Georgina Martina Inc
(Anti-Discrimination Exemption)
[2012] VCAT 1384;
Cornish College (Anti-Discrimination Exemption)
[2012] VCAT 889; BAE Systems Australia Limited
(Anti-Discrimination Exemption)
[2012] VCAT 349.
61 Casey Aquatic & Recreation Centre (Anti-
Discrimination) [2012] VCAT 893.
62 [2012] VCAT 24. The Charter was referred to in three
other FOI decisions in 2012, where the Tribunal
recognised its Charter obligations but found that no
human rights were engaged: see Charteris v Victorian
WorkCover Authority (General)
[2012] VCAT 817;
Tregale v Department of Human Services (General)
[2012] VCAT 722; and Whinnett v Office of Public
Prosecutions (General)
[2012] VCAT 573.
VCAT considered four exemption applications
in 2012. Three exemptions were granted, with
each held to be a reasonable limit on the equality
right.
60
In the fourth, an aquatic centre applied for
an exemption so it could open only for women,
girls and their young sons for two hours on Friday
evenings. VCAT found that an exemption was not
necessary because the conduct amounted to a
"special measure" under the Equal Opportunity
Act, which is a measure "for the purpose of
promoting or realising substantive equality for
members of a group with a particular attribute".
61
The special measure in that case was to provide
opportunities for women (and, in some cases, their
children) to participate in aquatic activities, when
they might not otherwise be able to do so due to
religious, cultural or other personal reasons.
VCAT is also a public authority when it considers
freedom of information (FOI) applications. For
example, in Horrocks v Department of Justice,
62
a prisoner at Port Phillip Prison made an FOI
request to the Department of Justice for a copy
of CCTV footage showing an assault on him by
prison security officers. The Department refused.
VCAT upheld the Department's refusal after
concluding that the footage was exempt from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act 1982
because: it would be likely to impede
the proper administration of the prison; it would
be an unreasonable disclosure of information
relating to the personal affairs of prison staff;
and it revealed information about prison security
measures that was confidential information
under the Corrections Act 1986. VCAT found that
unconditional release of the footage would not
be in the public interest and therefore the "public
interest override" did not apply.